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Abstract
A new cryptographic tool, anonymous quantum key technique, is introduced that
leads to unconditionally secure key distribution and encryption schemes that can be
readily implemented experimentally in a realistic environment. If quantum memory
is available, the technique would have many features of public-key cryptography; an
identification protocol that does not require a shared secret key is provided as an illus-
tration. The possibility is also indicated for obtaining unconditionally secure quantum
bit commitment protocols with this technique.
This paper has the same title as my Capri talk but the contents are not identical. The
portion on anonymous key is greatly expanded here, while only brief mention is made on
quantum bit commitment, a detailed treatment of which is available in Ref. [1].
A classic goal of cryptography is privacy: two parties wish to communicate privately so
that an adversary can learn nothing about its content. This was usually achieved through the
use of a shared private key, typically a string of binary digits, for encrypting and decrypting
the message data. A revolution in cryptography occurred around 1976 with the emergence
of public-key cryptography [2], in which knowledge of a public key for encryption would not
lead to knowledge of a secret private key for decryption. The concept of digital signature, the
binding of a signer to an electronic digital message, was introduced via public-key technique.
The idea of using quantum physics for cryptographic purpose was first proposed by Wiesner
in the early 1970’s [3]. It came to fruition in the work of Bennett and Brassard [4] on key
distribution, culminating in an experimental prototype demonstration [5]. Despite earlier
papers on the use of quantum cryptography to achieve other cryptographic goals, it turns
out that key distribution is the only viable one so far [6]. Also, the lack of a quantum
authentication scheme implies that some standard classical technique has to be employed
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which takes away some of the novelty of the quantum techniques, which at first sight seem
to be public-key type protocols that do not require the prior sharing of secret information.
Consider two users, Adam and Babe, with a powerful adversary Eve who can manipulate
all the communications between them. In an intruder-in-the-middle or impersonation attack,
Eve can pretend to be Adam to Babe, and Babe to Adam, in all the known quantum proto-
cols. If Adam and Babe do not have a prior shared secret key for message authentication, it
is often assumed that a non-jammable classical public channel would prevent impersonation.
This, however, is not the case [7] as there is still a user authentication (identification) prob-
lem — without some shared prior framework there is nothing that distinguishes Babe from
an impersonator. Specifically, other than “eavesdropping” Eve may pretend to be Babe and
trick Adam to tell her something that he would only tell Babe. The use of a shared secret key
for authentication reduces the quantum cryptosystem to a key expansion scheme as noted
in Ref. [5], without many advantages of a public-key system. In particular, a separate key
is needed for each pair of users which causes major problems in a network environment.
In standard cryptography there are a variety of approaches [2] to dispense with the use of
shared secret keys, notably the use of digital signature for identification that is capable of
preventing the identifier or verifier to pretend to be the identifiee.
In this paper a new cryptographic tool, anonymous key encryption (AKE), is introduced
in the quantum context that has no known parallel in standard cryptography. In AKE,
the encrypter does not know the value of his encrypted message. If quantum states can
be stored, i.e., if quantum memory is available which is a subject of active current effort,
the AKE technique can be extended to a general anonymous key technique that leads to
various forms of digital signature and to a public-key type identification protocol, to be
called anonymous key identification (AKI), which does not require any shared secret key.
For key distribution, an unconditional security proof on the use of AKE would be described
for qubits, and it would be indicated how a similarly secure protocol may be obtained in
the presence of noise and loss by using classical error correcting codes. The possible use of
large-energy coherent states would also be indicated.
Let |ψA〉 ∈ H, where H is an arbitrary quantum state space, be a state known only to
Adam and transmitted by him to Babe. Depending on the message j ∈ {1, · · · , m} ≡ M
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that Babe wants to send to Adam, she modulates |ψA〉 with a unitary transformation U
B
j
and send UBj |ψA〉 back to Adam. From knowledge of |ψA〉 and the openly known U
B
j , Adam
can decrypt j. The idea is that without knowing |ψA〉, Eve cannot tell j without significant
error. The name anonymous key encryption is chosen because |ψA〉 acts like an encryption
key for Babe to generate the encrypted signal UBj |ψA〉 with data j. Often one has n qubits
H =
⊗nH2 with M = {0, 1}n.
Consider the following concrete AKE system for a single qubit m = 2, n = 1, so that an
arbitrary pure state ρA = |ψA〉〈ψA| is represented in terms of a real vector r¯ ∈ R
3 via the
Pauli matrices σ¯, in component form
ρA =
1
2
(I + r1σ1 + r2σ2 + r3σ3), |r¯|
2 = 1 (1)
If ρA is one of M possible uniformly distributed states on the (σ1, σ3) great circle of the
Bloch sphere (or Poincare sphere in the context of photon polarization), we have
r1 = cos
2πℓ
M
, r2 = 0, r3 = sin
2πℓ
M
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (2)
If j = 1, Babe rotates ρA by an angle
π
2
clockwise on this great circle, and if j = 0,
she rotates it by an angle π
2
counterclockwise, i.e., UBj = U(φj), the rotation matrix with
φj = ±
π
2
. These two states are orthogonal in a basis known only to Adam, which he can
measure to determine j. Equivalently, the rotation angles may be {0, π} or some other
pairs. In order that U(φj)|ψA〉 is one of the M possible states ρA(ℓ) of (1) − (2), M is
taken to be a multiple of 4. If Adam picks ρA(ℓ) randomly, the resulting density operator
ρB =
∑
ℓ
1
M
U(φj)ρA(ℓ)U
†(φj) from B to A is the same for either j. Thus, even if Eve has
an identical copy [8] of the state sent back to A, she can gain no information on j. This
generalizes to a sequence of independent ρiA(ℓ) with independent i, for which Eve’s optimal
joint attack on ρB just factorizes into a product of individual attacks.
The security analysis is carried out via the theory of optimal M-ary quantum detector
[9, 10] in which 1 out of M possibilities, each described by a state ρj and a priori probability
pj, is selected to optimize a given performance criterion. The selection is based on the result
of a general quantum measurement described by a positive operator-valued measure (POM),
which is specified to yield the optimal performance. If Eve attempts to identify ρA(ℓ) by
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intercepting the transmission to Babe, the best she can do is given by the optimum M-ary
quantum detector for discriminating the states (1)− (2), which has been worked out before.
Lemma 3 of Ref. [10] gives the optimum quantum measurement in the form of a POM, with
corresponding probability of correct identification given by P ′c = 2/M . However, even if Eve
makes an error, her estimated state is still useful for eavesdropping purpose and a different
criterion needs to be used. Generally, it is the probability Pa that Eve’s estimated state is
accepted to be correct by Adam as a result of his measurement.
Pa =
∑
ℓ,ℓ′
1
M
p(ℓ′|ℓ)trρA(ℓ)ρ
E
A(ℓ
′) (3)
where p(ℓ′|ℓ) = trΠ(ℓ′)ρA(ℓ) is the probability that given ρA(ℓ) was transmitted, Eve takes
it to be ρEA(ℓ
′) from measuring the POM Π(ℓ′). Such a criterion falls under the general
optimum quantum detector formulation, and the optimum Π(ℓ′) for (3) turns out [11] to be
the same as that of determining ρA(ℓ) according to the error probability criterion, which is
intuitively reasonable. The resulting Pa is given by 3/4 independently of M (but recall that
M is a multiple of 4). Thus, if Eve measures Π(ℓ′) to determine ρA(ℓ), perhaps because she
cannot store the actual ρA(ℓ), and transmits ρ
E
A(ℓ
′) to Babe, determines j by measurement on
U(φj)ρ
E
A(ℓ
′)U †(φj) from Babe, and sends the resulting state back to Adam, the probability
that Adam decrypts correctly is 3/4. Pure guessing without measurement yields Pa = 1/2.
This Pa = 3/4 would be reduced to 2/3 if the whole Bloch sphere is utilized, with ρA given
by (1) with r1 = sin θ cos φ, r2 = cos θ, r3 = sin θ sin φ, and e.g., U
B
j = U(θj), θj = ±
π
2
with φ
unchanged. In the case (2), M = 4 is enough to yield Pa = 3/4, and in this case a total of
M = 6 states [12] on the poles of any rectangular coordinate system intercepting the Bloch
surface would yield Pa = 2/3. In both cases Eve can get these values of Pa without knowing
M by measuring an orthogonal basis chosen randomly from theM possible states. Evidently
Pa can be further reduced if a higher dimensional H is used.
If Eve could intercept and store ρA(ℓ), she could eavesdrop perfectly by sending her own
ρE(ℓ
′) to Babe in an impersonation attack. Such manipulation can be detected with test
qubits mixed into the information qubits. However, a different approach is employed here
in which Babe sends her modulated qubits back to Adam in a random order. This has the
advantage that all possible eavesdroppings can be thwarted without checking for disturbance,
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thus allowing a simple proof of protocol security for key establishment. In this scheme, Adam
and Babe use AKE with 8k qubits to establish a key of length 4k while expending a shared
secret key of length 2k, resulting in a net key expansion of 2k as follows. For each 8 qubit
block, Babe sends back the qubits in one of the following four orders equiprobably using 2
secret bits: 12345678, 87654321, 38462715, 41236587. These four sequences are chosen so
that there is no qubit overlap in any position among the eight. Eve can alter the qubits
from A to B in an impersonation attack, or to conduct opaque eavesdropping, or to conduct
translucent eavesdropping by tapping into the communications between A and B to learn
about j. The probability that Eve guesses q of the k qubit groups in the right order in an
impersonation attack is given by the binomial distribution with success probability 1/4, and
thus is exponentially small in q. The rest she induces an error probability Pe = 1/2 per qubit
for Adam, and the key establishment would fail in a trial encryption.
Eve may employ an opaque eavesdropping strategy by intercepting and re-transmitting
the states from A to B and B to A. Instead of using disturbance detection, we merely
use classical privacy amplification (CPA) [13] to eliminate Eve’s partial information. Eve’s
success probability Pc per qubit is bounded as follows. We grant her one copy of ρA(ℓ) and
one copy of the corresponding correct U(φj)ρA(ℓ)U
†(φj), i.e., we allow Eve to intercept both
copies exactly as if there is no disturbance and the order is correct. From these two copies
she can try to learn j by optimally processing both states. This is a binary detection problem
with two states
ρ0,1 =
M∑
ℓ=1
1
M
ρA(ℓ)ρA
(
ℓ∓
M
4
)
(4)
for which the optimum probability of discrimination can be obtained by diagonalizing ρ0−ρ1
[9]. The resulting optimum probability Pc she would determine j correctly turns out to be the
same as that obtained by measuring the optimum state detector on the copy ρA(ℓ) from A to
B and then measuring whether the state ρB(ℓ) from B to A is clockwise or counterclockwise
with respect to ρA(ℓ), which is intuitively reasonable, and is given by Pc = Pa. If Eve
launches a joint attack by making measurements on blocks of qubits, she cannot obtain a
better accuracy than that of measuring one by one — the optimum quantum detector for
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the bit error sum factorizes when both the states and the data probabilities of the blocks
factorize into a product from the corresponding bits.
In translucent eavesdropping, Eve would try to determine the data j by correlating her
tappings from A to B and B to A. She can do this in the correct order only with probability
1/4. Thus, to (loosely) bound all the possible information Eve can obtain, we let her succeed
in learning the bits exactly with probability 1/4, and with probability 3/4 we let her learn
the bits with probability Pc = Pa as in (4) above. For Pa = 3/4, this yields a total of 2k
deterministic bits and < k Shannon bits, which can be eliminated by expending 4k bits or
just 3k bits asymptotically [5, 13]. This completes the security proof in the ideal limit.
Note that no quantum memory is required in this scheme. We have used very loose
bounds to avoid complex arguments and bounding techniques, but the resulting efficiency
is still appreciable. The present AKE has no apparent classical analog because listening to
both the transmissions from A to B and B to A would reveal too much about the bits in
a classical system even when the bit order is random. The intrinsic statistical feature of
quantum ontology, that it is impossible to determine the state of a single quantum system
exactly, is directly expoited in AKE. The basic ingredients of our security guarantee are:
use of qubit order randomization to thwart manipulation and correlation, use of optimum
quantum detector and copies to Eve to bound her partial information which is eliminated
by classical privacy amplification, and use of classical error correcting code to overcome loss
and noise to be presently discussed. In particular, the explicit use of a shared secret key for
key expansion, in this case in obtaining secret qubit orders, is a new technique that I expect
to be widely applicable in many scenarios.
The major problem for quantum security proof lies in the presence of loss and noise
in realistic systems. It should be clear that the above security proof does not depend on
detecting small disturbance by Eve, and can thus be expected to work in a similar way in the
presence of small noise and loss with some simple error correction capability. In particular,
one may employ classical error correcting codes (CECC) on qubits in lieu of quantum codes.
Thus, each codeword in a CECC (xi), xi ∈ {0, 1}, becomes a codeword of quantum states
(|xi〉), where |xi〉 is the state corresponding to 0 and 1 in the quantum modulation scheme
adopted. No reconciliation[5] is needed with the use of CECC.
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The protocol for AKE key distribution is in general:
(i) Adam sends enough randomly chosen |ψA〉’s to Babe to cover the loss and noise in
transmission to Babe as well as the CECC Babe needs to use for transmission back to
Adam.
(ii) Babe modulates the information qubits in a known CECC, sends the resulting qubits
to Adam in a random order according to a short shared secret key.
(iii) Some form of CPA is employed by Adam to eliminate any possible leakage of informa-
tion which is strictly bounded.
(iv) The resulting key is checked for correctness by a trial encryption.
There are many variations of this protocol including the use of test qubits or quantum
memory in lieu of shared secret key. There are also many ways to use AKE for direct
encryption. These topics and the security proof of the above protocol will be developed
elsewhere.
If quantum states can be stored, some features of public-key cryptography can be obtained
as follows. In classical public-key cryptography, a one-way function f : X → Y is roughly a
map for which one can obtain y = fx ∈ Y from x ∈ X readily but it is “infeasible” to obtain
x from fx. A one-way trapdoor function results if x can be readily obtained from fx with
additional “trapdoor information” relating to f [14]. For a physically given |ψA〉, the function
M→ H with j mapped into UBj |ψA〉 can be regarded as a quantum one-way function with
trapdoor information given by the knowledge of the actual state |ψA〉, to be denoted KψA.
Thus, |ψA〉 functions like a quantum public key while KψA is the private key. Similar to
the usual one-way trapdoor function, one can obtain the physical state UBj |ψA〉 with a given
public key |ψA〉, but cannot obtain from U
B
j |ψA〉 the value j without the knowledge KψA.
This is the general formulation of the anonymous quantum key technique. It is clear that
AKE can be described in this way, with Adam sending Babe his public key |ψA〉 and Babe
using |ψA〉 to encrypt a message j which only Adam can decrypt with KψA. With |ψA〉
representing a sequence of qubits, a number of standard public key protocols can be recasted
in the quantum domain. For example, one-time digital signatures and blind signatures [2]
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can be implemented this way. Here, we would use the anonymous key technique to obtain
a quantum identification protocol AKI of the challenge-response type in which the identifier
cannot pretend to be the identifiee and which is an exact analog of a protocol [15] based
on classical digital signature. In AKI Adam uses his stored |φB〉, φB unknown to him, to
identify Babe in the following way. He modulates |φB〉 ∈ H2 with a randomly chosen φA
and transmits |φB + φA〉 to Babe, say for states of the form (1) - (2), and asks her to return
the state |φA〉with φB removed which Babe is capable of doing by just adding −φB to the
angle in |φB + φA〉. Adam checks by measuring the projection to |φA〉. The random φA is
necessary, or else Eve can just return the state |φ = 0〉, where φ = 0 is the reference angle,
without using |φB〉 sent by Adam. The protocol can be simply summarized:
(i) A→ B : |φB + φA〉
(ii) B → A : |φA〉
(5)
The probability that Adam or Eve could successfully impersonate Babe is Pa for one qubit,
which can be brought to any desired security level Ps = (Pa)
m with m qubits exponentially
efficiently. Apart from using quantum laws instead of number theoretic complexity assump-
tions, the security of this protocol is evidently the same as the conventional public-key
challenge-response indentification protocol [15]. Note that the success of AKI is independent
of that of AKE, with both being examples of the anonymous quantum key technique.
This technique can also be used to obtain unconditionally secure quantum bit commit-
ment schemes, outside the framework of the impossibility proof [6], which is not sufficiently
general to rule out all such schemes. In one of these, Babe sends anonymous states to Adam
for bit modulation and the anonymous nature of the states prevents Adam from determining
the cheating unitary transformation on his committed state. In another, the anonymous
states prevent both Adam and Babe from cheating. A detailed treatment of quantum bit
commitment is given in ref [1].
Some comments on possible experimental realization are in order. If (1)-(2) are realized
via photon number polarization, a small M is sufficient as indicated after Eq. (3). Although
our protocol is much simpler, the experimental setup would be quite similar to BB84, and
the efficiency would suffer greatly in the presence of loss. In the present M-ary approach,
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however, it can be improved via large-energy coherent states by the use of a further new
technique to be elaborated elsewhere. One underlying reason for such possibility can be
explained. Consider the coherent states
|α0(cos θℓ + i sin θℓ〉, θℓ =
2πℓ
M
(6)
for a real positive α0 in place of (1) − (2). Any two basis states of (6) have inner product
exp(−2α2
0
) ∼ 0 for large α0. When M → ∞ or when M is unknown, one obtains Pa = 1/2
with heterodyne detection and Pa < 2/3 for the canonical phase measurement which is the
maximum likelihood phase estimator [16]. This important behavior of having Pa independent
of α0 would also be obtained for a known finite M ≫ α0, as a lower bound to the mean-
square fluctuation (δθ)2 was obtained [17] that goes as 1/|α|2 for coherent states |α〉. In
the Pa expression, this fluctuation would cancel out the α
2
0
in the form 2α2
0
sin2 δθ
2
when
M ≥ 2π/δθ. A two-mode coherent state realization similar to (6), with |α0 cos θℓ〉|α0 sin θℓ〉,
can also be used. In either case M ∼ 103 is easily achievable in the laboratory, with much
higher M ≥ 106 possible, so that large α0 can be used for overcoming loss and noise. This
is not possible in previous quantum cryptosystems such as modified BB84 because large
α0 would lead to unambiguous determination of the states involved, which is not the case if
there are many statesM ≫ α0. The use of (6) also allows the possibility of amplification and
regeneration along the transmission path using quantum amplifiers [18], as well as routing
and switching in a network. Analysis of such coherent-state systems will be given in a future
publication detailing how key distribution and encryption can be carried out. It appears
that they hold great promise in making secure quantum cryptography truly practical.
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